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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

P. O. Box 2604

Washington, D. C. 20013

16 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Lorrie Secrest  
Public Liaison Office, USIA

SUBJECT: Appearances of U.S. Officials on Soviet TV

Ms. Secrest:

1. Appearances by U.S. officials on Soviet television are so rare that we can only recall a few exceptions to the general Soviet principle that statements by U.S. officials on Soviet television explaining the U.S. Government's position are normally not permitted. FBIS does not keep files on U.S. persons (prohibited by Executive Order) which makes the compilation of specific statistics very difficult, but we can make some valid observations based on the memories of analysts and monitors.

2. When Americans appear on Soviet TV, they are usually shown briefly and saying innocuous things. Americans are more likely, obviously, to be invited to express opinions in depth when their views support Soviet positions. An example is Bernard Lown, a Harvard physician active in the Physicians Against Nuclear War group. He has been interviewed several times on Soviet television, especially in June 1982 when much publicity was given his group.

3. As for American officials, Moscow from time to time seeks out interviews with Congressmen or other officials who disagree with current Administration policy. As for officials of the Administration and others, Moscow occasionally shows them in newscasts, such as Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, interviewed early in 1985 when he led a trade delegation; Speaker O'Neill, interviewed recently upon his airport departure; and Vice President Bush, when he attended the Chernenko funeral, shown but not interviewed.

4. The appearance of the U.S. Ambassador on the 4th of July has been spotty, depending on relations at the time. According to our records, Ambassador Hartman presented a statement in 1983 but not in 1984. The Department of State can give you the authoritative reasons why. His 1983 statement is attached.

SUBJECT: Appearances of U.S. Officials on Soviet TV

5. An exception to the general rule is Commentator Aleksandr Bovin's "International Panorama" program. This television feature on rare occasions includes interviews with U.S. officials and prominent personalities, with Bovin refuting their arguments in his commentary. On 6 February 1983 the program's Washington correspondent, Druzhinin, provided an interview with former Senator William Fulbright and John Fisher, president of the American Security Council Foundation. On 12 June 1983 the program carried an interview with Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State. Copies are attached.

6. It can be said with confidence that Soviet television does not permit U.S. officials to use the medium as a platform for putting forth U.S. positions. The rare exceptions to this are indicated above, and except for the Ambassador's 4th of July statement such interviews are carefully handled and rebutted by Soviet commentators.



✓ Director

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Attachments:

- A: Interview with Fulbright and Fisher
- B: Interview with Kenneth Dam
- C: Ambassador's 4th of July Statement (1983)

DDS&T/FBIS/ [redacted] 16 Apr 85)

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TAKE 1 OF 2 -- BOVIN ON DISARMAMENT

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MOSCOW DOMESTIC TELEVISION SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1500 GMT

6 FEB 83

((FROM THE "INTERNATIONAL PANORAMA" PROGRAM PRESENTED BY  
ALEKSANDR BOVIN; VIDEOTAPED ALEKSANDR DRUZHININ INTERVIEWS WITH  
WILLIAM FULBRIGHT AND JOHN FISHER IN ENGLISH WITH SUPERIMPOSED  
RUSSIAN TRANSLATION))

((TEXT)) ((BOVIN)) HELL, COMRADES! WHEN THE ROUND UP PANORAMA WAS BEING PREPARED IN DECEMBER, WE ASKED ALEKSANDR DRUZHININ, OUR CORRESPONDENT IN WASHINGTON, TO INTERVIEW TWO LEADING AMERICAN POLITICIANS ON WHAT THEY THINK ABOUT SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS; WE WANTED ONE TO BE A MODERATE, AND THE OTHER TO BE 100 PERCENT HAWK; THE WAY IT TURNED OUT, THE MODERATES AGREED TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS OF SOVIET TELEVISION, BUT THE HAWKS, UNDER VARIOUS PRETEXTS, SHIED AWAY FROM THIS INTERVIEW, SO THINGS DRAGGED ON, BUT DRUZHININ KEPT AT IT, AND IN THE END HE CAUGHT HIS REAL HAWK, SO WE WILL NOW BEGIN WITH TWO INTERVIEWS, THE FIRST SPEAKER IS SENATOR WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, HE IS A VERY WELL KNOWN MAN IN AMERICA, FOR A LONG TIME HE WAS CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SO THE FIRST OF DRUZHININ'S INTERVIEWS IS WITH FULBRIGHT, PLEASE LOOK AND LISTEN!

((BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)) ((DRUZHININ)) SENATOR, WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS LAST YEAR?

((FULBRIGHT)) THEY WERE NOT SATISFACTORY; APART FROM THE RIVALRY WHICH IS NATURAL FOR TWO GREAT POWERS, I SEE NO REASON TO EXPLAIN WHY OUR RELATIONS SHOULD BE SO ANTAGONISTIC; I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A RESTORATION OF THE AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF JOINT PROJECTS; AND I WOULD LIKE THERE TO BE REGULAR SUMMIT MEETINGS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES; THIS SHOULD BE DONE WITHOUT A LOT OF POMP; THEY SHOULD BE BUSINESSLIKE MEETINGS AT WHICH OUR LEADERS COULD PERSONALLY DISCUSS EXISTING DIFFERENCES AND COULD GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER.

((DRUZHININ)) AND WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A REDUCION IN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE?

((FULBRIGHT)) I THINK THAT ALL THE NATO COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES, SHOULD TAKE A SERIOUS ATTITUDE TOWARD THIS PROPOSAL; IT COULD SERVE THE CAUSE OF REAL PROGRESS AT THE

TO SAY HOW MANY MISSILES SHOULD REMAIN; BUT THE IDEA OF REDUCTION; OF CONTROL; IS OF VERY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE; IT IS FUNDAMENTALLY CONNECTED WITH THE RELAXATION OF TENSION; THE BUILDUP OF ARMAMENTS INVOLVES GREAT DANGER; SIMILAR EVENTS PRECEDED WORLD WAR II; WHEN THE COUNTRIES CONTINUED TO BUILD UP THEIR MILITARY POWER; SECURITY CANNOT BE ACHIEVED BY INCREASING THE QUANTITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THE PROPOSAL FOR A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MISSILES TO THE NUMBER OF MISSILES AT THE DISPOSAL OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE COMBINED IS A POSITIVE ONE; AND THOUGH IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO MAKE SOME CHANGES IN IT; ON THE WHOLE; THIS PROPOSAL IS A POSITIVE ONE;

((DRUZHININ)) I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, MR SENATOR; HOW YOU WOULD LIKE TO SEE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS DEVELOP IN THE FUTURE? WHAT ARE THE WAYS OF IMPROVING THEM?

((FULBRIGHT)) I WOULD LIKE TO SEE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCRAPPED; I WOULD LIKE TO SEE COOPERATION DEVELOP BETWEEN US INSTEAD OF RIVALRY; IF WE COULD PUT AN END TO THE ARMS RACE; IF WE COULD SUBORDINATE OUR DISAGREEMENTS -- SOME OF THEM ARE NOT THAT IMPORTANT -- TO THE COMMON INTEREST IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL; IF WE COULD BRING OTHER COUNTRIES INTO THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT -- THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES; THE NATO COUNTRIES -- ALL THIS WOULD REDUCE TO A MINIMUM THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER DISAGREEMENTS ARISING; DISAGREEMENTS EXIST BETWEEN US ON ANGOLA, ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, VIETNAM AND SO ON; THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST IS VERY SERIOUS; ALL THESE DISAGREEMENTS ARE VERY SERIOUS; AND THEY COULD LEAD THE TWO GREAT POWERS INTO A CONFLICT; WHICH IS SOMETHING WE MUST AVOID; BUT I SEE NO REASON WHICH WOULD PREVENT US COOPERATING INSTEAD OF SPENDING VAST SUMS ON THE SENSELESS BUILDUP OF ARMAMENTS; (END VIDEOTAPE)

((BOVIN)) AS YOU SEE, COMRADES, FULBRIGHT MAKES A SOBER ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS;



COULD AND SHOULD BE BETTER, BUT NOW LISTEN TO ANOTHER AMERICAN; HE IS JOHN FISHER, PRESIDENT OF THE SO-CALLED AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL; HE IS NOT OF THE SAME CALIBRE AS FULBRIGHT OF COURSE; BUT ON THE WHOLE, IN RIGHT-WING CIRCLES, ON THE RIGHT FLANK, HE IS QUITE A WELL-KNOWN FIGURE; SO HERE IS THE NEXT INTERVIEW:

((BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)) ((DRUZHININ)) MR FISHER, THE GRAPH OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IS AT A VERY LOW POINT AT THIS MOMENT; WHAT, IN YOUR VIEW, ARE THE REASONS FOR THE PRESENT TENSION?

((FISHER)) AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IT IS NECESSARY TO BE FRANK;

((DRUZHININ)) YES;

((FISHER)) THE WAY IT SEEMS TO US, THE REASONS FOR TENSION ARE SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND YOUR BUILDUP OF YOUR ARMED FORCES TO SUPPORT THIS EXPANSIONISM;

((DRUZHININ)) DO YOU THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION REPRESENT A THREAT TO WASHINGTON?

((FISHER)) YES; IF ONE ANALYZES ALL THE STATEMENTS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS, YOUR COUNTRY IS DEVOTED TO THE IDEAS OF MARXISM-LENINISM; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNIST SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, IN PLACE OF THE CAPITALIST AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF THE FREE WORLD, WHICH ARE TO BE REPLACED BY COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS; YOU HAVE WORKED OUT A STRATEGY FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS AIM; YOU HAVE CREATED IN THE SOVIET UNION THE MATERIAL-TECHNICAL BASE, AND YOU HAVE SECURED THE SUPPORT OF OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS AIM; IF CHANGES WERE TO TAKE PLACE IN THIS POLICY, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SHOULD SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NO LONGER PURSUING SUCH A POLICY, AND THEN TENSION WOULD BE REDUCED;

((DRUZHININ)) DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION, AS MANY ARE SAYING HERE, WOULD BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES?

WOULD BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; I KNOW THAT THE  
SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS DECLARED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO  
USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

((DRUZHININ)) DO YOU THINK THAT CERTAIN PROBLEMS FACING OUR  
COUNTRIES SHOULD BE SOLVED BY PEACEFUL MEANS; THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS?

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THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS?

TAKE 2 OF 2 -- BOVIN ON DISARMAMENT

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((TEXT)) ((FISHER)) NATURALLY, WE AIM FOR THE ELIMINATION OF  
DISAGREEMENTS THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS; BUT FOR THIS PURPOSE  
RECIPROCITY IS NEEDED, A DESIRE TO REACH MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE

LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE, YOU HAVE BEEN CONTINUING TO BUILD UP YOUR ARMED FORCES; IN THE PAST 13 YEARS, YOU HAVE INCREASED THE NUMBER OF YOUR STRATEGIC WEAPONS BY MORE THAN 1,000 UNITS -- MISSILES AIMED AT THE UNITED STATES, BOMBERS AIMED AT THE UNITED STATES -- WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT DEPLOYED A SINGLE NEW BOMBER OR A SINGLE NEW INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILE; THE UNITED STATES HAS BUILT ONLY ONE NEW NUCLEAR SUBMARINE; I REPEAT, MORE RECIPROCITY IS NEEDED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS; IF WE WANT TO ACHIEVE A REAL AGREEMENT;

((DRUZHININ)) IT LOOKS AS THOUGH EVERYTHING DEPENDS ON THE SOVIET UNION?

((FISHER)) I THINK THAT WE HAVE ALREADY DONE A GREAT DEAL; SINCE 1967 WE HAVE FROZEN THE LEVEL OF OUR INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES; THE LEVEL OF OUR BOMBERS; WE HAVE EVEN REDUCED THEIR NUMBER SINCE THEN; I DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE WE COULD DO. AS I HAVE ALREADY SAID, RECIPROCITY IS NEEDED; I AM CONVINCED THAT OUR LEADERSHIP WILL REACT TO ANY PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP; ((END VIDEOTAPE))

((BOVIN)) THAT IS THE VOICE OF A REAL DYED-IN-THE-WOOL REAGANITE; WELL; OF COURSE, MOSCOW IS TRYING TO OVERTHROW BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENTS ALL THE TIME; OF COURSE, WHEREVER SOME SORT OF UPRISING OR REVOLUTION TAKES PLACE, IT IS DONE BY THE HAND OF MOSCOW'S AGENTS; IT IS SENSELESS TO ARGUE WITH SUCH A PRIMITIVE, VULGAR APPROACH TO HISTORY AND TO THE WORLD; THE COMPLEX WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO LOOK MORE ATTENTIVELY AT ONE ASPECT OF FISHER'S REASONING;

YOU MUST HAVE NOTICED HOW FISHER REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD, ALLEGEDLY, LONG AGO FROZEN ITS ARMAMENTS, BUT THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO ARM; SO WE HAVE THIS PICTURE OF A WEAK, DEFENSELESS AMERICA IN THE FACE OF THE SOVIET THREAT; FURTHERMORE, IT IS NOT ONLY FISHER WHO USES THIS THEME; IT APPEARS

OF COURSE THE CONCLUSION IS: GIVE MONEY TO THE PENTAGON; IT IS NECESSARY TO ARM UP; WE MUST CATCH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT LET US SEE HOW THE MATTER STANDS IN ACTUAL FACT;

LET US TAKE A HIGHLY GENERALIZED INDICATOR, SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS; IT IS NOT AIRCRAFT <sup>R</sup> OF BOMBERS WHICH FALL ON TARGETS, NOR IS IT LAUNCHERS; TARGETS ARE HIT BY WARHEADS; SO LET US JUST TAKE A LOOK AT THIS; I HAVE HERE A BOOK CALLED SECURITY FOR ALL: PROGRAM FOR DISARMAMENT; IT WAS PREPARED BY A COMMISSION, AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION, ON MATTERS OF DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF OLOF PALME -- THE PALME COMMISSION; IT IS CALLED; THIS QUITE INTERESTING BOOK CONTAINS THIS DIAGRAM TAKE A LOOK AT IT; ((BOVIN SHOWS DIAGRAMS COMPARING U.S. AND SOVIET WARHEADS -- FBIS)) THIS TOP LINE SHOWS THE DYNAMIC, THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS; THE BOTTOM LINE SHOWS THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION, LOOK AT THE YEAR 1972, WHEN THE FIRST SALT AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED; SEE THE GAP, THE ADVANTAGE HELD BY AMERICA; IT IS QUITE CONSIDERABLE, BUT ON THE WHOLE THIS WAS CONSIDERED TO BE APPROXIMATE MILITARY PARITY; NOW, INSTEAD OF, AS FISHER AND OTHERS SAY, HAVING FROZEN ARMS, LOOK, THE AMERICANS ARE TAKING A GREAT LEAP FORWARD; WE ARE GOING ALONG ALMOST HORIZONTALLY; BY 1975, THE GAP HAD BECOME VERY WIDE, AND THEN WE HAD TO CATCH UP WITH THE AMERICANS, THIS WE DID; WHEN WE BEGAN TO DO THIS TOWARD THE END OF THE EIGHTIES ((AS HEARD -- FBIS)) ALL THIS HYSTERIA WELLED UP IN WASHINGTON;

YET THERE ARE REALLY NO GROUNDS FOR ALL THESE HYSTERICS, BECAUSE, AS YOU SEE FROM THESE DIAGRAMS, APPROXIMATE STRATEGIC MILITARY PARITY CONTINUES TO EXIST, WHAT IS SHOWN ON THIS DIAGRAM IS PERFECTLY WELL KNOWN BOTH TO THE AMERICANS AND TO THEIR ALLIES; WHEN, AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, FLYING IN THE FACE OF THE OBVIOUS, THE AMERICANS START TALKING ABOUT THE SUPERIORITY OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE LAGGING BEHIND OF THE AMERICANS, ALL THIS AROUSES

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III. 13 Jun 83

U S S R I N T E R N A T I O N A L A F F A I R S  
DISARMAMENT/START/MBFR

AA 1

U.S. OFFICIALS INTERVIEWED ON DISARMAMENT

LD121911 Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 12 Jun 83

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Aleksandr Bovin]

[Text] Hello, comrades! The fourth round of talks on strategic arms limitations and reduction began last week in Geneva. Unfortunately, the preceding three rounds produced no positive results. I will not now compare the Soviet and U.S. positions. The relevant figures and arguments have on several occasions been indicated in our press.

On the eve of the fourth round the Americans have decided to show flexibility. Noisy publicity is now being given to the new approach of President Reagan. The history of this is as follows: For a long time the White House had been haggling with Congress. The President insisted that Congress should allocate money for the MX missile while Congress insisted that the President should show more common sense at these same talks.

And here is what they agreed upon: Congress allocated \$625 million to begin work and the President promised to adopt a more flexible position.

What new things did President Reagan propose? Kenneth Dam, U.S. deputy secretary of state, will now tell us about this. Aleksandr Druzhinin had an interview with Dam, and for technical reasons the first question was not recorded on the tape. I will now read it to you:

Mr Deputy Secretary of State, asked Druzhinin, what will the new U.S. approach be to the problem of limiting and reducing strategic weapons?

[Begin video recording; questions and answers in English with superimposed translation]

[Dam] The United States wants to reduce nuclear weapons and, furthermore, to reduce them substantially. Therefore, we are proposing to the Soviet Union to mutually reduce the number of nuclear warheads to 5,000. Here we are speaking of the number of warheads and not missiles, since certain missiles are armed not with one but with several warheads.

Thus the number of warheads will be reduced by approximately one-third. We also have an interest in maintaining parity in the number of missiles and the number of warheads, as well as parity in throw-weight [vyvodimyy ves], that is, the destructive potential of these types of weapons.

And finally, we consider that the fulfillment of any agreement must be subject to verification. These are our basic proposals.

And now for the statement by President Reagan. He said that since our figures were much lower than the figure proposed by the Soviet Union, we are ready to go to meet the Soviet Union, for we think that the talks should take into consideration the interests of both sides. In our opinion, this will facilitate progress at the talks.

The President also proposed a method for applying indirect pressure, or, in other words, an indirect way of reducing throw-weight. However, if the USSR prefers, as the President stressed, to conduct the talks on the destructive potential of strategic weapons on the plane [v plan] of reducing the throw-weight tonnage, then we are ready for that too.

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
DISARMAMENT/START/MBFR

Those are the basic changes in the U.S. position. They are based on the results of discussion of this problem with members of the U.S. Congress and also on the report by the Scowcroft independent commission.

[Druzhinin] I cannot but ask you the following question. There are quite a few people who are convinced that the United States aspires to conduct talks with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, from a position of military superiority. What can you say about that?

[Answer] It is undoubtedly true that we believe in strength. We think that if the United States is weak, then the Soviet Union will not have the incentive to conduct serious talks, but besides that, no matter what you are talking about, be it strategic weapons or medium-range missiles in Europe, then in all these areas, it is in fact the Soviet Union which has superiority over the United States. And so we do believe in strength, but we are not aspiring to military superiority. The only thing to which we do aspire is parity.

[Question] The conviction exists in the Soviet Union that the program for deploying MX missiles, which the United States is now implementing as well as other programs for building other types of strategic weaponry, does not indicate a sincere desire on the part of the United States to achieve the restraining of the arms race.

[Answer] I would say that both our countries are engaged in upgrading their weapons systems. And we consider that our arms modernization process is proceeding extremely slowly. To be sure, in the 1970's we deployed no new weapons. But the fact that we are ready to build new weaponry in itself is far from an indication of absence on our part of readiness to hold talks about these weapons.

[Question] And what can you say about the U.S. position on the question of freezing nuclear weapons?

[Answer] We do not think that a freeze on nuclear weapons would help resolve the problem of potential instability in the world or eliminate the risk of war.

As I have already said, what we are interested in is substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals. In our opinion, talks on a nuclear freeze would boil down to such questions as stopping tests on nuclear weapons, ways of verifying agreements, etc.

Let us rather hold talks on reducing stocks of nuclear weapons, and after that it may be possible to freeze nuclear weapons at a lower quantitative level.

[Question] As a representative of the U.S. Administration, what could you say about the prospects for the Geneva talks?

[Answer] That question is often asked, but it is not an easy one to answer. I would say that we are neither optimistic nor pessimistic. As the President stated, we are ready to modify our positions so as to reach agreement based on the principles of balance, parity, verification, and mutual benefit.

We consider that if the Soviet Union is also ready to change its position and to hold serious talks, then agreement will become possible. And so we are ready and waiting for corresponding steps in the same direction by the Soviet Union. [end recording]



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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
DISARMAMENT/START/MBFR

In just a little while I will return to what Mr Dam has told us. But for the time being, listen to the opinion of another American, retired Rear Admiral Gene La Rocque, director of the Washington Center for Defense Information.

[Begin video recording; questions and answers in English, with superimposed translation]

[La Rocque] The U.S. approach to the problem of limiting and reducing strategic weapons does not have the necessary scope. The U.S. side is now proposing setting a limit on the number of warheads on strategic missiles -- only for missiles. However, if one compares the number of warheads of all types of weaponry in the strategic nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union, then it turns out that overall the United States has more warheads. So I would say that President Reagan is seriously inclined as far as strategic arms control is concerned, but only so far as this concerns control of Soviet weapons, not of U.S. weapons.

In general, if one examines the policy of the current administration in the area of arms control, then it is not hard to note that it shows interest only in control regarding certain highly limited aspects of this problem, and I consider that if the United States really wants serious talks with the USSR, then it should agree that the talks should cover all sorts of nuclear weapons, all systems for delivering such weapons.

[Druzhinin] What can you say about the program for building MX missiles? Is such a program compatible with a sincere desire to establish control over the arms race?

[Answer] Frankly, President Reagan's approach, which links arms control with an increase in the nuclear arms race, is simply laughable. What happens is that the United States favors incompatible things at the same time; it favors both arms control and increases in weaponry. Washington goes so far as to give as a justifying argument that the arms race allegedly promotes disarmament. Is that not a paradox? MX is a very dangerous weapons system. Midgetmen are no less dangerous missiles. There is much talk about them at present in Washington. So it emerges that the more the United States talks about arms control, the more new nuclear weapons systems they aspire to build.

[Question] Using as a basis the numerous statements by high-ranking representatives of the Reagan administration, it is not difficult to reach the following conclusion: The United States considers that talks with the Soviet Union must be conducted from a position of strength, we Americans would view that as blackmail. I am very suspicious of this position, which stems from the premise that increasing weapons would allegedly be a basic condition for reducing them.

[Question] What is your opinion of the USSR proposal on freezing nuclear weapons, a proposal which has been rejected by the U.S. Administration?

[Answer] I am very satisfied with the fact that the Soviet Union supports the idea of a freeze on nuclear weapons. Of course, Soviet-U.S. talks on this issue would not be easy. But still I would like our government also to approve the idea of a nuclear freeze and to try, along with the Soviet Union, to go to the talks table on this issue. I am convinced that, first of all, the creation, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons must be stopped and that they must then be reduced. [end recording]

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USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
DISARMAMENT/START/MBFR

And there you have, as they say, first-hand information. I think La Rocque has quite accurately defined the weak points in the American approach to the talks. I would just like to add a few thoughts. It is, of course, rather difficult to carry on polemics with Mr Dam, as his judgements are very streamlined, but anyway... He says, for example, that the United States did not deploy any new weapons during the seventies. Wonderful! But it was precisely during that decade that the Americans increased the number of warheads in their strategic arsenal by almost more than twofold. And, you see, the targets are struck not by the missiles themselves, nor by aircraft or submarines, but precisely by warheads. So it's not worth the Americans' while to [word indistinct] here.

On another issue -- the freeze, for example. Here is Mr Dam's logic: If we start talks on freezing, then we'll get mixed up in all kinds of difficulties over control there, let's say, and so on. [as heard] And so let's start by reducing and then freeze. But the point here is that all these difficulties indicated also exist in the talks on arms reduction. That's the first point. Secondly, it's a completely different issue here, because the Americans want to talk of disarmament on the one hand, while building up arms on the other. And so this freeze is of no use to them whatsoever.

And finally, regarding Reagan's new approach proper: The President, as you heard Mr Dam say, went to meet the Soviet Union halfway, for he agreed to a higher ceiling on the number of ballistic missiles than the existing 850. Well, formally this may be true, but in reality the Americans have in fact gone to meet themselves halfway, because they are currently reviewing the issue of the mass production of Midgetmen single-unit missiles [monoblochnaya raketa] and this obviously does not fit within the 850 limit. This is why they needed these free figures.

- Let's sum up. The old American proposals were openly aimed at severely reducing the basis of our defense potential: our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. - And it is precisely in this most important respect that Reagan's new approach does not amount to anything new -- absolutely nothing. If one is to believe American sources, in 1976, when Reagan still lived in California and not in the White House, he listed as some of the fundamental freedoms America takes pride in: the freedom to try and to be wrong; and the freedom to make mistakes and to do what others may find stupid. An it seems to me sometimes that certain Americans misuse this freedom. There is no small number of Americans, however, who consider that one may of course make mistakes, but when it's a matter of whether there is to be a war or not, it's better not to make mistakes but to limit the freedom to commit stupidities. Antiwar and antimilitaristic moods are infecting more and more sections of American society.

#### NEW U.S. PROPOSALS 'UNACCEPTABLE AS BEFORE'

LD101532 Moscow TASS in English 1357 GMT 10 Jun 83

["On the Same Positions" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow June 10 TASS -- TASS military correspondent Vladimir Bogachev writes: The following main conclusion is seen sufficiently clearly in the numerous comments of the world press on U.S. President Reagan's statement as regards talks on limiting and reducing strategic armaments: No substantial changes have taken place in the U.S. position at the talks in Geneva, the U.S. proposals are as unacceptable to the Soviet Union as before.

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III. 8 Jul 83

A 4

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
UNITED STATES & CANADA

Gaps in the memory of CIA director William Casey, who, according to people who know him, usually does not look into his notes when testifying at congressional hearings and has no difficulty in recalling events which took place years ago, are particularly amazing.

When a NEW YORK TIMES correspondent interviewed Casey the latter, apparently, had forgot all about having ever had in his hands those plans and even claimed that it would have been "totally uncharacteristic and quite incredible" for him to have obtained documents from the headquarters of the Democratic Party. "After being involved in seven presidential campaigns, I know that's dynamite," Casey stated.

These categorical assertions by William Casey are all the more strange since one of the "heroes" of the "Reagangate," James Baker, a high-ranking White House official, said that the papers from Carter's headquarters on the basis of which Reagan's speeches had been prepared had been coming directly from Casey.

The name of the CIA director has been coming up more than once in the American press in connection with scandalous exposures. A few months after he had assumed office, Casey became the subject of an official inquiry over financial machinations. A group of Democratic congressmen obtain 20 cases of documents about Casey's financial dealings. However, the most important compromising materials were missing from them: most likely, he had taken care that those papers should disappear forever.

Meanwhile, he faced serious charges, in particular, the use of his post to collect information about the market situation. It should be recalled that William Casey has interest in 27 companies with assets abroad. A person with access to secret market research information is a "godsend" to the managers of those companies.

Up to now gaps in memory at the right moment and the support of President Reagan, his personal friend, have been helping Casey to get off the hook. In view of all this, NEWSWEEK concludes that the "Reagangate" hardly threatens to chase William Casey out of office: in the past he survived even worse troubles.

#### U.S. AMBASSADOR HARTMAN HOSTS EMBASSY RECEPTION

PM070945 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jul 83 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "To Mark Holiday"]

[Text] On 4 July Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, held a reception to mark the national holiday -- Independence Day.

The reception was attended by V.G. Komplektov, USSR deputy foreign minister, and other officials.

#### U.S. AMBASSADOR'S 4 JUL STATEMENT ON MOSCOW TV

LD051445 Moscow Domestic Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 4 Jul 83

[Statement by U.S. Ambassador Arthur Hartman on the occasion of U.S. Independence Day; in English fading into translation]

[Text] I would like to begin my address by expressing greetings and best wishes to the people of the Soviet Union from the people of the United States. Today, on 4 July, my country is marking the 207th anniversary of the proclamation of its independence. Each year, we cherish even more the rights guaranteed to Americans by the Declaration of Independence.

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( This document made it possible for us to achieve major social changes in the framework of its structure. We value our freedom not only for the free life that is ensured for us -- and the happiness of this life, which is also one of the major results -- but also for our constitutional guarantees which give us the opportunity to make choices. We believe that a human can achieve the maximum growth of his abilities only if he can make his own choices. The sum total of these opportunities for personal choice is represented by what we have achieved as a nation.

This year the economy of our country is setting an example for the world as it reemerges from a serious economic slump. We made decisions which were necessary to create more jobs for the increasing numbers of our self-employed population, taking into consideration present technical and economic realities. These new jobs will be more rewarding financially and morale-wise, and will result in greater productivity, compared with the jobs that were abolished. In this way, there will be an input of new, fresh power into the productivity of our labor force.

At the same time, we are giving economic assistance to the developing countries of the Third World in the form of the exportation of U.S. private capital and the availability of state financial aid. Once again, we shall produce a record yield of agricultural crops with the help of those who work on the farms and represent less than 4 percent of our population. All this is taking place in an atmosphere that encourages artistic, scientific, and literary creativity.

( We are peaceful people and our only desire is to be able to achieve our own aspirations and to create more fulfilling lives for us and for our children. However, the American people are aware that this cannot be done while our security and the security of our friends and allies is unprotected from outside threats. Therefore, we are prepared to provide this protection, in the knowledge that this is the best way of preventing war and preserving our freedom. America does not intend to attack any country. We are not trying to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union. American arms, be they nuclear or nonnuclear, will never be used for purposes other than defense.

This year, our two countries -- the USSR and the United States -- will celebrate the 50th anniversary of establishing relations. We have witnessed many changes in our relations during this period. We fought together against a common enemy. We also remained rivals because of the antithesis of our different social systems and ideological values. We Americans wish that it would be possible to reduce the danger of war and to show restraint despite this rivalry. This is the essence of the message sent by my President to Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov on the occasion of his election to the post of chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

President Reagan said, and I quote: As you assume your new duties, I hope that we shall be able jointly to find ways of facilitating peace, by reducing the level of armaments and by moving forward toward eliminating force and the threat of the use of force in the settlement of international controversies. You shall have my full cooperation in attaining these objectives on the basis of equality, reciprocity, and respect for the rights and interests of all.

( Such are the hopes of the Americans as we enter into the second half-century of our mutual relations. We are looking for spheres where our interests coincide and where we can develop beneficial cooperation. I have traveled widely in your country since I came here nearly 2 years ago. It seems to me that I can sense the same feelings among your peoples. Let us work together to make our hopes a reality. Thank you.